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ABSTRACT
Accurately learning from user data while providing quantifiable
privacy guarantees provides an opportunity to build better ML
models while maintaining user trust. This paper presents a for-
mal approach to carrying out privacy preserving text perturba-
tion using the notion of dχ -privacy designed to achieve geo-
indistinguishability in location data. Our approach applies care-
fully calibrated noise to vector representation of words in a high di-
mension space as defined by word embedding models. We present
a privacy proof that satisfies dχ -privacy where the privacy param-
eter ε provides guarantees with respect to a distance metric de-
fined by the word embedding space. We demonstrate how ε can
be selected by analyzing plausible deniability statistics backed up
by large scale analysis on GloVe and fastText embeddings. We
conduct privacy audit experiments against 2 baseline models and
utility experiments on 3 datasets to demonstrate the tradeoff be-
tween privacy and utility for varying values of ε on different task
types. Our results demonstrate practical utility (< 2% utility loss
for training binary classifiers) while providing better privacy guar-
antees than baseline models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving data analysis is critical in the age of Machine
Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) where the availabil-
ity of data can provide gains over tuned algorithms. However, the
inability to provide sufficient privacy guarantees impedes this po-
tential in certain domains such as with user generated queries.
As a result, computation over sensitive data has been an impor-
tant goal in recent years [18, 25]. On the other hand, private data
that has been inappropriately revealed carries a high cost, both in
terms of reputation damage and potentially fines, to data custodi-
ans charged with securing curated information. In this context, we
distinguish between security and privacy breaches as follows: a se-
curity breach is unintended or unauthorized system usage, while
a privacy breach is unintended or unauthorized data disclosure
during intended system uses [6]. Unintended disclosures, or acci-
dental publications which lead to re-identification have been two
common causes of recent privacy breaches [2, 7, 18, 39, 41, 55, 56].
While it is possible to define rules and design access policies to im-
prove data security, understanding the full spectrum of what can
constitute a potential privacy infraction can be hard to predict a
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priori. As a result, solutions such as pattern matching, ad hoc fil-
ters and anonymization strategies are provably non-private. This
is because such approaches cannot anticipate what side knowledge
an attacker can use in conjunction with the released dataset. One
definition that takes into account the limitations of existing ap-
proaches by preventing data reconstruction and protecting against
any potential side knowledge is Differential Privacy.
Differential Privacy (DP) [21], which originated in the field of
statistical databases, is one of the foremost standards for defining
and dealing with privacy and disclosure prevention. At a high level,
a randomized algorithm is differentially private if its output dis-
tribution is similar when the algorithm runs on two neighboring
input databases. The notion of similarity is controlled by a param-
eter ε ≥ 0 that defines the strength of the privacy guarantee (with
ε = 0 representing absolute privacy, and ε = ∞ representing null
privacy). Even though DP has been applied to domains such as ge-
olocation [4], social networks [40] and deep learning [1, 50], less
attention has been paid to adapting variants of DP to the context of
Natural Language Processing (NLP) and the text domain [15, 59].
We approach the research challenge of preventing leaks of pri-
vate information in text data by building on the quantifiable pri-
vacy guarantees of DP. In addition to these formal privacy require-
ments, we consider two additional requirements informed by typi-
cal deployment scenarios. First, the private mechanism must map
text inputs to text outputs. This enables the mechanism to be de-
ployed as a filter into existing text processing pipelines without
additional changes to other components of the system. Such a re-
quirement imposes severe limitations on the set of existing mech-
anisms one can use, and in particular precludes us from leverag-
ing hash-based private data structures commonly used to iden-
tify frequent words [22, 54, 58]. The second requirement is that
the mechanism must scale to large amounts of data and be able
to deal with datasets that grow over time. This prevents us from
using private data synthesis methods such as the ones surveyed
in [10] because they suffer from severe scalability issues even in
moderate-dimensional settings, and in general cannot work with
datasets that grow over time. Together, these requirements push
us towards solutions where each data record is processed inde-
pendently, similar to the setting in Local DP (LDP) [31]. To avoid
the curse of dimensionality of standard LDP we instead adopt dχ -
privacy [3, 4, 14], a relaxed variant of local DP where privacy is
defined in terms of the distinguishability level between inputs (see
Sec. 2.3 for details).
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Our main contribution is a scalable mechanism for text analy-
sis satisfying dχ -privacy. The mechanism operates on individual
data records – adopting the one user, one word model as a baseline
corollary to the one user, one bit model in the DP literature [31].
It takes a private input word x , and returns a privatized version xˆ
where the word in the original record has been ‘perturbed’. The
perturbation is obtained by first using a pre-determined word em-
bedding model to map text into a high-dimensional vector space,
adding noise to this vectorial representation, and the projecting
back to obtain the perturbed word. The formal privacy guarantees
of this mechanism can be interpreted as a degree of plausible de-
niability [8] conferred to the contents of x from the point of view
of an adversary observing the perturbed output. We explore this
perspective in detail when discussing how to tune the privacy pa-
rameters of our mechanism.
The utility of the mechanism is proportional to how well the
semantics of the input text are preserved in the output. The main
advantage of our mechanism in this context is to allow a higher
degree of semantics preservation by leveraging the geometry pro-
vided by word embeddings when perturbing the data. In this work
we measure semantics preservation by analyzing the performance
obtained by using the privatized data on downstream ML tasks in-
cluding binary sentiment analysis, multi-class classification, and
question answering. This same methodology is typically used in
NLP to evaluate unsupervised learning of word embeddings [49].
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We provide a formal approach to carrying out intent preserving
text perturbation backed up by formal privacy analysis (Sec. 2).
2. We provide a principled way to select the privacy parameter ε
for dχ -privacy on text data based on geometrical properties of
word embeddings (Sec. 3).
3. We conduct analysis on two embedding models, providing in-
sights into words in the metric space (Sec. 4). We also show how
the vectors respond to perturbations, connecting the geometry
of the embedding with statistics of the dχ -privacy mechanism.
4. We apply our mechanism to different experimental tasks, at dif-
ferent values of ε , demonstrating the trade-off between privacy
and utility (Sec. 5).
2 PRIVACY PRESERVING MECHANISM
Consider a single word x submitted by a user interacting with an
information system. E.g. x might represent a response to a survey
request, or an elicitation of a fine grained sentiment. In particular,
x will contain semantic information about the intent the user is try-
ing to convey, but it also encodes an idiosyncratic representation of
the user’s word choices. Even though the wordmight not be explic-
itly personally identifiable information (PII) in the traditional sense
of passwords and phone numbers, recent research has shown that
the choice of words can serve as a fingerprint [12] via which trac-
ing attacks are launched [52]. Our goal is to produce xˆ , a version of
x that preserves the original intent while thwarting this attack vec-
tor. We start the section by giving a high-level description of the
rationale behind our mechanism and describing the threat model.
Then we recall some fundamental concepts of dχ -privacy. Finally,
we provide a detailed description of our mechanism, together with
a formal statement of its privacy guarantees.
2.1 Mechanism Overview
We start by providing a high-level description of our mechanism.
Our mechanism applies a dχ -privacy mechanism xˆ = M(x) to ob-
tain a replacement for the given word x . Such replacement is sam-
pled from a carefully crafted probability distribution to ensure that
xˆ conveys a similar semantic to x while at the same time hiding any
information that might reveal the identity of the user who gener-
ated x . Intuitively, the randomness introduced by dχ -privacy pro-
vides plausible deniability [8] with respect to the original content
submitted by the user. However, it also permits a curator of the
perturbed words to perform aggregate sentiment analysis, or to
cluster survey results without significant loss of utility.
2.2 Utility Requirements and Threat Model
When designing our mechanismwe consider a threat model where
a trusted curator collects a word from each user as x(1),x(2), . . .
and wishes to make them available in clear form to an analyst
for use in some downstream tasks (such as clustering survey re-
sponses or building ML models). The data is collected in the ‘one
user, one word’ model, and we do not seek to extend theoretical pro-
tections to aggregate user data in this model. Unfortunately, pro-
viding words in the clear presents the challenge of unwittingly giv-
ing the analyst access to information about the users interacting
with the system. This could be either in the form of some shared
side knowledge between the user and the analyst [33], or through
an ML attack to learn which users frequently use a given set of
words [51, 52]. Our working assumption is that the exact word is
not necessary to effectively solve the downstream tasks of inter-
est, although the general semantic meaning needs to be preserved
to some extent; the experiments in Sec. 5 give several examples of
this type of use case. Thus, we aim to transform each submission
by using randomization to provide plausible deniability over any
potential identifiers.
2.3 Privacy over Metric Spaces
Over the last decade, Differential Privacy (DP) [21] has emerged
as a de facto standard for privacy-preserving data analysis algo-
rithms. Several variants of DP have been proposed in the literature
to address a variety of settings depending on whether, for example,
privacy is defined with respect to aggregate statistics and ML mod-
els (curator DP) [21], or privacy is defined with respect to the data
points contributed by each individual (local DP) [31].
Since our application involves privatizing individual words sub-
mitted by each user, LDP would be the ideal privacy model to con-
sider. However, LDP has a requirement that renders it impractical
for our application: it requires that the given word x has a non-
negligible probability of being transformed into any other word xˆ ,
nomatter how unrelated x and xˆ are. Unfortunately, this constraint
makes it virtually impossible to enforce that the semantics of x are
approximately captured by the privatized word xˆ , since the space
of words grows with the size of the language vocabulary, and the
number of words semantically related to x will have vanishingly
small probability under LDP.
To address this limitation we adopt dχ -privacy [3, 14], a relax-
ation of local DP that originated in the context of location privacy
to address precisely the limitation described above. In particular,
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dχ -privacy allows a mechanism to report a user’s location in a
privacy-preserving manner, while giving higher probability to lo-
cations which are close to the current location, and negligible prob-
ability to locations in a completely different part of the planet. dχ -
privacy was originally developed as an abstraction of the model
proposed in [4] to address the privacy-utility trade-off in location
privacy.
Formally, dχ -privacy is defined for mechanisms whose inputs
come from a set X equipped with a distance function d : X×X →
R+ satisfying the axioms of a metric (i.e. identity of indiscernibles,
symmetry and triangle inequality). The definition of dχ -privacy
depends on the particular distance function d being used and it
is parametrized by a privacy parameter ε > 0. We say that a ran-
domized mechanism M : X → Y satisfies εdχ -privacy if for any
x, x ′ ∈ X the distributions over outputs ofM(x) and M(x ′) satisfy
the following bound: for all y ∈ Y we have
Pr[M(x) = y]
Pr[M(x ′) = y]
≤ eεd (x,x
′)
. (1)
We note that dχ -privacy exhibits the same desirable properties
of DP (e.g. composition, post-processing, robustness against side
knowledge, etc.), but we won’t use these properties explicitly in
our analysis; we refer the reader to [14] for further details.
The type of probabilistic guarantee described by (1) is charac-
teristic of DP: it says that the log-likelihood ratio of observing any
particular output y given two possible inputs x and x ′ is bounded
by εd(x,x ′). The key difference between dχ -privacy and local DP
is that the latter corresponds to a particular instance of the former
when the distance function is given byd(x,x ′) = 1 for every x , x ′.
Unfortunately, this Hamming metric does not provide a way to
classify some pairs of points inX as being closer than others. This
indicates that local DP implies a strong notion of indistinguishabil-
ity of the input, thus providing very strong privacy by “remember-
ing almost nothing” about the input. Fortunately,dχ -privacy is less
restrictive and allows the indistinguishability of the output distri-
butions to be scaled by the distance between the respective inputs.
In particular, the further away a pair of inputs are, the more dis-
tinguishable the output distributions can be, thus allowing these
distributions to remember more about their inputs than under the
strictly stronger definition of local DP. An inconvenience of dχ -
privacy is that the meaning of the privacy parameter ε changes
if one considers different metrics, and is in general incomparable
with the ε parameter used in standard (local) DP (which can lead
to seemingly larger privacy budget values as the dimensionality of
the metric space increases). As a result, this paper makes no claim
to provide privacy guarantees in the traditional sense of classical
DP. Thus, in order to understand the privacy consequences of a
given ε in dχ -privacy one needs to understand the structure of the
underlying metric d . For now we assume ε is a parameter given to
the mechanism; we will return to this point in Sec. 3 where we an-
alyze the meaning of this parameter for metrics on words derived
from embeddings. All the metrics described in this work are Eu-
clidean. For discussions on dχ -privacy over other metrics (such as
Manhattan and Chebyshev, see [14])
2.4 Method Details
We now describe the proposed dχ -privacy mechanism. The full
mechanism takes as input a string x containing |x | words and out-
puts a string xˆ of the same length. To privatize x we use a dχ -
privacy mechanism M : X → X, where X = Wℓ is the space
of all strings of length ℓ with words in a dictionary W. The met-
ric between strings that we consider here is derived from a word
embedding model ϕ : W → Rn as follows: given x, x ′ ∈ Wℓ for
some ℓ ≥ 1, we let d(x, x ′) =
∑ℓ
i=1 ‖ϕ(wi ) − ϕ(w
′
i )‖, where wi
(resp. w ′i ) denotes the ith word of x (resp. x
′), and ‖ · ‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm on Rn . Note that d satisfies all the axioms of
a metric as long as the word embedding ϕ is injective. We also
assume the word embedding is independent of the data to be pri-
vatized; e.g.we could take an available word embedding like GloVe
[44] or train a new word embedding on an available dataset. Our
mechanism M works by computing the embedding ϕ(w) of each
word w ∈ x , adding some properly calibrated random noise N to
obtain a perturbed embedding ϕˆ = ϕ(w) + N , and then replacing
the wordw with the word wˆ whose embedding is closest to ϕˆ. The
noise N is sampled from an n-dimensional distribution with den-
sity pN (z) ∝ exp(−ε ‖z‖), where ε is the privacy parameter of the
mechanism. The following pseudo-code provides implementation
details for our mechanism.
Algorithm 1: Privacy Preserving Mechanism
Input: string x = w1w2 · · ·wℓ , privacy parameter ε > 0
for i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ } do
Compute embedding ϕi = ϕ (wi )
Perturb embedding to obtain ϕˆi = ϕi + N with noise density
pN (z) ∝ exp(−ε ‖z ‖)
Obtain perturbed word wˆi = arдminu∈W ‖ϕ (u) − ϕˆi ‖
Insert wˆi in ith position of xˆ
release xˆ
See Sec. 2.6 for details on how to sample noise from the multi-
variate distribution pN for different values of ε .
2.5 Privacy Proof
The following result states that our mechanism M satisfies εdχ -
privacy with respect to the metric d defined above.
Theorem 1. For any ℓ ≥ 1 and any ε > 0, the mechanism M :
Wℓ →Wℓ satisfies εdχ -privacy with respect to d .
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is to observe thatM can
be viewed as a combination of the generic exponential mechanism
construction for the metric d together with a post-processing strat-
egy that does not affect the privacy guarantee of the exponential
mechanism. However, we chose not to formalize our proof in those
terms; instead we provide a self-contained argument leading to a
more direct proof without relying on properties of dχ -privacy es-
tablished elsewhere.
To start the proof, we first consider the case ℓ = 1 so that x =
w ∈ W and x ′ = w ′ ∈ W are two inputs of length one. For any
possible output word wˆ ∈ W we define a set Cwˆ ⊂ R
n containing
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all the feature vectors which are closer to the embeddingϕ(wˆ ) than
to the embedding of any other word. Formally, we have
Cwˆ =
{
z ∈ Rn : ‖z − ϕ(wˆ )‖ < min
u ∈W\{wˆ }
‖z − ϕ(u)‖
}
.
The setCwˆ is introduced because it is directly related to the proba-
bility that the mechanismM on input x = w produces wˆ as output.
Indeed, by the description of M we see that we get M(w) = wˆ if
and only if the perturbed feature vector ϕˆ = ϕ(w) + N is closer to
ϕ(wˆ ) than to the embedding of any other word in W. In particu-
lar, letting pϕ (w )+N (z) denote the density of the random variable
ϕ(w) + N , we can write the probability of this event as follows:
Pr[M(w) = wˆ] = Pr[ϕ(w) + N ∈ Cwˆ ] =
∫
Cwˆ
pϕ (w )+N (z)dz
=
∫
Cwˆ
pN (z − ϕ(w))dz ∝
∫
Cwˆ
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w)‖)dz ,
where we used thatϕ(w)+N has exactly the same distribution ofN
but with a different mean. Nowwe note that the triangle inequality
for the norm ‖ · ‖ implies that for any z ∈ Rn we have the following
inequality:
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w)‖) =
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w)‖)
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖)
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖)
= exp(ε(‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖ − ‖z − ϕ(w)‖))
× exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖)
≤ exp(ε ‖ϕ(w) − ϕ(w ′)‖) exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖)
= exp(εd(w,w ′)) exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖) .
Combining the last two derivations and observing the the normal-
ization constants in pN (z) and pϕ (w )+N (z) are the same, we obtain
Pr[M(w) = wˆ]
Pr[M(w ′) = wˆ]
=
∫
Cwˆ
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w)‖)dz∫
Cwˆ
exp(−ε ‖z − ϕ(w ′)‖)dz
≤ exp(εd(w,w ′)) .
Thus, for ℓ = 1 the mechanism M is εdχ -privacy preserving.
Now we consider the general case ℓ > 1. We claim that because
the mechanism treats each word in x = w1 · · ·wℓ independently,
the result follows directly from the analysis for the case ℓ = 1. To
see this, we note the following decomposition allows us to write
the output distribution of themechanism on strings of length ℓ > 1
in terms of the output distributions of the mechanism on strings
of length one: for x, xˆ ∈ Wℓ we have
Pr[M(x) = xˆ] =
ℓ∏
i=1
Pr[M(wi ) = wˆi ] .
Therefore, using thatM is dχ -privacy preserving with respect to d
on strings of length one, we have that for any pair of inputs x, x ′ ∈
Wℓ and any output xˆ ∈ Wℓ the following is satisfied:
Pr[M(x) = xˆ]
Pr[M(x ′) = xˆ]
=
ℓ∏
i=1
(
Pr [M(wi ) = wˆi ]
Pr [M(w ′i ) = wˆi ]
)
≤
ℓ∏
i=1
exp(εd(wi ,w
′
i )) = exp(εd(x,x
′)) ,
where we used that the definition of d is equivalent to d(x,x ′) =∑ℓ
i=1d(wi ,w
′
i ). The result follows. 
2.6 Sampling from the Noise Distribution
To sample from pN , first, we sample a vector-valued random vari-
able v = [v1 . . .vn ] from the multivariate normal distribution:
p(x ; µ, Σ) =
1
(2π )n/2 |Σ|1/2
exp
(
−
1
2
(x − µ)T Σ−1(x − µ)
)
.
where n is the dimensionality of the word embedding, the mean µ
is centered at the origin and the covariance matrix Σ is the identity
matrix. The vector v is then normalized to constrain it in the unit
ball. Next, we sample a magnitude l from the Gamma distribution
p(x ;n,θ) =
xn−1e−x/θ
Γ(n)θn
.
where θ = 1/ε and n is the embedding dimensionality. A sample
noisy vector at the privacy parameter ε is therefore output as lv.
More details on the approach can be found in [60, Appendix E].
3 STATISTICS FOR PRIVACY CALIBRATION
In this section we present a methodology for calibrating the ε pa-
rameter of our dχ -privacy mechanism M based on the geometric
structure of the word embeddingϕ used to define the metric d . Our
strategy boils down to identifying a small number of statistics as-
sociated with the output distributions of M , and finding a range
of parameters ε where these statistics behave as one would expect
from a mechanism providing a prescribed level of plausible denia-
bility.We recall that the main reason this is necessary, and why the
usual rules of thumb for calibrating ε in traditional (i.e. hamming
distance based) DP cannot be applied here, is because the meaning
of ε in dχ -privacy depends on the particular metric being used and
is not transferable across metrics. We start by making some quali-
tative observations about how ε affects the behavior of mechanism
M . For the sake of simplicity we focus the discussion on the case
where x is a single word x = w , but all our observations can be
directly generalized to the case |x | > 1.
3.1 Qualitative Observations
The first observation is about the behavior at extreme values of
ε . As ε → 0 we have M(w) converging to the a fixed distribution
over W independent of w . This distribution will not be uniform
acrossW since the probability limε→0 Pr[M(w) = wˆ] will depend
on the relative size of the event Cwˆ defined in the proof of Thm. 1.
However, since this distribution is the same regardless of the input
w , we see that ε → 0 provides absolute privacy as the output pro-
duced by the mechanism becomes independent of the input word.
Such a mechanism will not provide preserve semantics as the out-
put is essentially random. In contrast, the regime ε →∞will yield
a mechanism satisfying M(w) = w for all inputs, thus providing
null privacy, but fully preserving the semantics. As expected, by
tuning the privacy parameter ε we can trade-off privacy vs. utility.
Utility for our mechanism comes in the form of some semantic-
preserving properties; we will measure the effect of ε on the utility
when we use the outputs in the context of a ML pipeline in Sec. 5.
Here we focus on exploring the effect of ε on the privacy provided
by the mechanism, so as to characterize the minimal values of the
parameter that yield acceptable privacy guarantees.
Our next observation is that for any finite ε , the distribution
of M(w) has full support on W. In other words, for any possible
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output wˆ ∈ W we have a non-zero probability that M(w) = wˆ .
However, we know from our discussion above that for wˆ , w
these probabilities vanish as ε → ∞. A more precise statement
can be made if one tries to compare the rate at which the probabili-
ties Pr[M(w) = wˆ] for different outputs wˆ . In particular, given two
outputs with d(w, wˆ) ≪ d(w, wˆ ′), by the definition of M we will
have Pr[M(w) = wˆ] ≫ Pr[M(w) = wˆ ′] for any fixed ε . Thus, tak-
ing the preceding observation and letting ε grow, one obtains that
Pr[M(w) = wˆ] goes to zero much faster for outputs wˆ far from w
than for outputs close to it. We can see from this argument that, es-
sentially, as ε grows, the distribution ofM(w) concentrates around
w and the words close tow . This is good from a utility point of view
– words close to w with respect to the metric d will have similar
meanings by the construction of the embeddings – but too much
concentration degrades the privacy guarantee since it increases the
probability Pr[M(w) = w] and makes the effective support of the
distribution ofM(w) too small to provide plausible deniability.
3.2 Plausible Deniability Statistics
Inspired by the discussion above, we define two statistics to mea-
sure the amount of plausible deniability provided by a choice of the
privacy parameter ε . Roughly speaking, in the context of text redac-
tion applications, plausible deniability measures the likelihood of
making correct inferences about the input given a sample from the
privatization mechanism. In this sense, plausible deniability can be
achieved by making sure the original word has low probability of
being released unperturbed, and additionally making sure that the
words that are frequently sampled given some input word induce
enough variation on the sample to hide which what the input word
was. A key difference between LDP and dχ -privacy is that the for-
mer provides a stronger form of plausible deniability by insisting
that almost every outcome is possible when a word is perturbed,
while the later only requires that we give enough probability mass
to words close to the original one to ensure that the output does
not reveal what the original word was, although it still releases in-
formation about the neighborhood where the original word was.
More formally, the statistics we look at are the probabilityNw =
Pr[M(w) = w] of not modifying the input word w , and the (effec-
tive) support of the output distribution Sw (i.e. number of possible
output words) for an inputw . In particular, given a small probabil-
ity parameter η > 0, we define Sw as the size of the smallest set of
words that accumulates probability at least 1 − η on inputw :
Sw = min |{S ⊆ X : Pr[M(w) < S] ≤ η}| .
Intuitively, a setting of ε providing plausible deniability should
have Nw small and Sw large for (almost) all words inw ∈ W.
These statistics can also be related to the two extremes of
the Rényi entropy [46], thus providing an additional information-
theoretic justification for the settings of ε that provide plausible
deniability in terms of large entropy. Recall that for a distribution
p over W with pw = PrW ∼p [W = w], the Rényi entropy of order
α ≥ 0 is
Hα (p) =
1
1 − α
log
( ∑
w ∈W
pαw
)
.
By taking the extremes α = 0 and α = ∞ one obtains the so-called
min-entropy H0(p) = log |supp(p)| and max-entropy H∞(p) =
log(1/maxw pw ), where supp(p) = {w : pw > 0} denotes the sup-
port ofp. This implies that we can see the quantities Sw and Nw as
proxies for the two extreme Rényi entropies through the approx-
imate identities H0(M(w)) ≈ log Sw and H∞(M(w)) ≈ log 1/Nw ,
where the last approximation relies on the fact that (at least for
small enough ε), w should be the most likely word under the dis-
tribution of M(w). Making these two quantities large amounts to
increasing the entropy of the distribution. In practice, we prefer to
work with the statistics Sw and Nw than with the extreme Rényi
entropies since the former are easier to estimate through simula-
tion.
4 ANALYSIS OF WORD EMBEDDINGS
A word embedding ϕ : W → Rn maps each word in some vocab-
ulary to a vector of real numbers. An approach for selecting the
model parameters is to posit a conditional probabilityp(o |w) of ob-
serving a word o given a nearby word or context w by taking the
soft-max over all contexts in the vocabulary as: [26].
p(o |w) =
exp
(
ϕ(o)⊤ϕ(w)
)
∑
w ′∈W exp
(
ϕ(w ′)⊤ϕ(w)
)
Such models are usually trained using a skip-gram objec-
tive [38] to maximize the average log probability of words
w given the surrounding words as a context window of
size m scans through a large corpus of words w1, . . . ,wT :
1
T
∑T
t=1
∑
−m≤j≤m, j,0 logp(wt+j |wt ).
The geometry of the resulting embedding model has a direct
impact on defining the output distribution of our redaction mecha-
nism. To get an intuition for the structure of these metric spaces –
i.e., how words cluster together and the distances between words
and their neighbors –we ran several analytical experiments on two
widely available word embedding models: GloVe [44] and fast-
Text [9]. We selected 319, 000 words that were present in both the
GloVe and fastText embeddings. Though we present findings
only from the common 319, 000 words in the embedding vocabu-
laries, we carried out experiments over the entire vector space (i.e.,
400, 000 for GloVe and 2, 519, 370 for fastText).
Our experiments provide: (i) insights into the distance d(x, x ′)
that controls the privacy guarantees of our mechanism for differ-
ent embedding models detailed below; and (ii) empirical evalua-
tion of the plausible deniability statistics Sw and Nw described in
Sec. 4.1 for the mechanisms obtained using different embeddings.
We analyzed the distance between each of the 319, 000
words and its k closest neighbors. The k values were
1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1000. We computed the Eu-
clidean distance between each word vector and its k neighbors.
We then computed 5th, 20th, 50th, 80th, and 95th percentile of
the distances for each of the k values. The line chart in Fig. 1
summarizes the results across the percentiles values by presenting
a logarithmic view of the increasing k values.
The line plot results in Fig. 1 give insights into how different
embeddingmodels of the same vector dimension can have different
distance distributions. The words in fastText have a smoother
distance distribution with a wider spread across percentiles.
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Figure 1: Distribution of distances between a given vector
and its k closest neighbors for GloVe and fastText
4.1 Word Distribution Statistics
We ran the mechanism 1, 000 times on input w to compute the
plausible deniability statistics Sw and Nw at different values of ε
for each word embedding model. For each word w and the corre-
sponding list of 1, 000 new wordsW ′ from our dχ perturbation,
we recorded: (i) the probability Nw = Pr[M(w) = w] of not mod-
ifying the input word w (estimated as the empirical frequency of
the event M(w) = w); and (ii) the (effective) support of the output
distribution Sw (estimated by the distinct words inW ′).
The results presented in Fig. 2 provide a visual way of select-
ing ε for task types of different sensitivities. We can select appro-
priate values of ε by selecting our desired worst case guarantees,
then observing the extreme values of the histograms for Nw and
Sw . For example, at ε = 5, no word yields fewer than 300 distinct
new words (Sw graph), and no word is ever returned more than
500 times in the worst case (Nw graph). Therefore, by looking at
the worst case guarantees of Sw and Nw over different values of
ε , we can make a principled choice on how to select ε for a given
embedding model.
4.2 Selecting Between Different Embeddings
Our analysis gives a reasonable approach to selecting ε (i.e., via
worst case guarantees) by means of the proxies provided by the
plausible deniability statistics. In general, tuning privacy parame-
ters in dχ -privacy is still a topic under active research [30], espe-
cially with respect to what ε means for different applications.
With regards to the same embedding model with different di-
mensionalities, Fig. 3 suggests that they do provide the same level
of average case guarantees (at ‘different’ values of ε). Therefore, se-
lecting a model becomes a function of utility on downstream tasks.
Fig. 3 further underscores the need to interpret the notion of ε in
dχ -privacy within the context of the metric space.
In Fig. 4, we present the average values of Sw and Nw statistics
forGloVe and fastText. However, the average values are not suf-
ficient to make a conclusive comparison between embedding mod-
els since different distributions can result in the same entropy –
therefore, we recommend setting worst case guarantees. For fur-
ther discussions on the caveats of interpreting entropy based pri-
vacy metrics see [57].
Table 1 presents examples of word perturbations on similar
mechanisms calibrated on GloVe and fastText. The results show
that as the average values ofNw increase (corresponding to higher
values of ε), the resulting words become more similar to the origi-
nal word.
5 ML UTILITY EXPERIMENTS
We describe experiments we carried out to demonstrate the trade-
off between privacy and utility for three downstream NLP tasks.
5.1 Datasets
We ran experiments on three textual datasets, each representing a
common task type in ML and NLP. The datasets are: IMDb movie
reviews (binary classification) [36], Enron emails (multi-class clas-
sification) [32], and InsuranceQA (question answering) [23]. Each
dataset contains contributions from individuals making them suit-
able dataset choices. Table 2 presents a summary of the datasets.
5.2 Setup for utility experiments
For each dataset, we demonstrated privacy vs. utility at:
Training time:we trained the models on perturbed data, while
testing was carried out on plain data. This simulates a scenario
where there is more access to private training data.
Test time: here, we trained the models completely on the avail-
able training set. However, the evaluationwas done on a privatized
version of the test sets.
5.3 Baselines for utility experiments
All models in our experiments use 300d GloVe embeddings (hence
the seemingly larger values of ε . See discourse in Sec. 2.3 and Fig. 3)
on Bidirectional LSTM (biLSTM) models [27].
IMDb movie reviews The training set was split to as in [36].
The privacy algorithmwas run on the partial training set of 15, 000
reviews. The evaluation metric used was classification accuracy.
Enron emails Our test set was constructed by sampling a ran-
dom 10% subset of the emails of 10 selected authors in the dataset.
The evaluation metric was also classification accuracy.
InsuranceQAWe replicated the results from [53] with Geomet-
ric mean of Euclidean and Sigmoid Dot product (GESD) as sim-
ilarity scores. The evaluation metrics used Mean Average Preci-
sion (MAP) and Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR).
The purpose of our baseline models was not to advance the state
of the art for those specific tasks. They were selected to provide a
standard that we could use to compare our further experiments.
5.4 Results for utility experiments
Table 2 presents a high level summary of some properties of the 3
datasets. It gives insights into the size of the vocabulary of each
dataset, the total number of words present, the average length
and standard deviation of sentences. The InsuranceQA dataset con-
sisted of short one line questions within the insurance domain –
this is reflective in its smaller vocabulary size, shorter sentence
length and small variance. The other 2 datasets consisted of a
broader vocabulary and wide ranging sentence structures.
We now discuss the individual results from running the dχ al-
gorithm on machine learning models trained on the 3 datasets pre-
sented in Fig. 5. We start with the binary sentiment classification
task on the IMDb dataset. Across the 3 experiments, we observe
the expected privacy utility trade-off. As ε increases (greater pri-
vacy loss), the utility scores improve. Conversely, at smaller values
of ε , we record worse off scores. However, this observation varies
across the tasks. For the binary classification task, at training and
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Figure 2: Empirical Sw and Nw statistics for 50 dimensional GloVe word embeddings as a function of ε .
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Figure 3: Average Sw and Nw statistics: GloVe 50d and 300d
Dataset IMDb Enron InsuranceQA
Task type binary multi-class QA
Training set size 25, 000 8, 517 12, 887
Test set size 25, 000 850 1, 800
Total word count 5, 958, 157 307, 639 92, 095
Vocabulary size 79, 428 15, 570 2, 745
Sentence length
µ = 42.27
σ = 34.38
µ = 30.68
σ = 31.54
µ = 7.15
σ = 2.06
Table 2: Summary of selected dataset properties
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Figure 4: Average Sw andNw statistics:GloVe and fastText
test time, the model remains robust to the injected perturbations.
Performance degrades on the other 2 tasks with the question an-
swering task being the most sensitive to the presence of noise.
6 ML PRIVACY EXPERIMENTS
Wenow describe howwe evaluate the privacy guarantees from our
approach against two query scrambling methods from literature.
6.1 Baselines for privacy experiments
We evaluated our approach against the following baselines:
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Figure 5: dχ -privacy scores against utility baseline
Versatile [5] – using the ‘semantic’ and ‘statistical’ query
scrambling techniques. Sample queries were obtained from the pa-
per.
Incognito [37] – using perturbations ‘with’ and ‘without’ noise.
Sample queries were also obtained from the paper.
6.2 Datasets
Search logs – The two evaluation baselines [5, 37] sampled data
from [43] therefore, we also use this as the dataset for our ap-
proach.
6.3 Setup for privacy experiments
We evaluate the baselines and our approach using the privacy audi-
tor described in [52]. We modeled our experiments after the paper
as follows: From the search logs dataset [43], we sampled users
with between 150 and 500 queries resulting in 8, 670 users. We ran-
domly sampled 100 users to train and another 100 users (negative
examples) to test the privacy auditor system.
For each evaluation baseline, we dropped an existing user, then
created a new user and injected the scrambled queries using the
baseline’s technique. The evaluation metrics are: Precision, Recall,
Accuracy and Area Under Curve (AUC). The metrics are computed
over the ability of the privacy auditor to correctly identify queries
used to train the system, and queries not used to train the system.
6.4 Results for privacy experiments
The metrics in Table 3 depict privacy loss (i.e. lower is better). The
results highlight that existing baselines fail to prevent attacks by
the privacy auditor. The auditor is able to perfectly identify queries
that were perturbed using the baseline techniques regardless of
whether they were actually used to train the system or not.
Model Precision Recall Accuracy AUC
Original queries 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Versatile (semantic) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Versatile (statistical) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Incognito (without noise) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Incognito (with noise) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
dχ -privacy (at ε = 23) 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.36
Table 3: Results: scoresmeasure privacy loss (lower is better)
Conversely, our dχ approach in the last line of Table 3 and ex-
panded in Table 4, show we are able provide tunable privacy guar-
antees (over 3x greater than baselines for ε ≤ 23 on AUC scores).
Across all metrics (at ε ≤ 23), our privacy guarantees is better than
chance.
ε for GloVe 300d
Metric 6 12 17 23 29 35 41 47 52
Precision 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.90 0.93 1.00 1.00
Recall 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.30 0.50
Accuracy 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.65 0.75
AUC 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.36 0.61 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.98
Table 4: dχ -privacy results: all scores measure privacy loss
7 DISCUSSION
We have described how to achieve formal privacy guarantees in
textual datasets by perturbing the words of a given query. Our
experiments on machine learning models using different datasets
across different task types have provided empirical evidence into
the feasibility of adopting this technique. Overall, our findings
demonstrate the tradeoffs between desired privacy guarantees and
the achieved task utility. Previous work in data mining [11, 35] and
privacy research [24, 28] have described the cost of privacy and the
need to attain tunable utility results. Achieving optimal privacy as
described in Dalenius’s Desideratum [20] will yield a dataset that
confers no utility to the curator. While techniques such as homo-
morphic encryption [25] hold promise, they have not been devel-
oped to the point of practical applicability.
8 RELATED WORK
Text redaction for privacy protection is a well understood and
widely studied problem [13] with good solutions currently found
wanting [29]. This is amplified by the fact that redaction needs
vary. For example, with transactional data (such as search logs),
the objective is anonymity or plausible deniability so that the iden-
tity of the person performing the search cannot be ascertained.
On the other hand, with plain text data (such as emails and med-
ical records), the objective might be confidentiality so that an in-
dividual is not associated with an entity. Our research is designed
around conferring plausible deniability in search logs while cre-
ating a mechanism that can be extended to other plain text data
types.
The general approach to text redaction in literature follows
two steps: (i) detection of sensitive terms, and (ii) obfuscation of
the identified entities. Our approach differs from related works in
these two tasks. With respect to (i) in transactional data, [37] is
predicated on defining private queries and sensitive terms based
on uniformity, uniqueness and linkability to predefined PII such as
names and locations. This approach however doesn’t provide pri-
vacy guarantees for queries that fall outside this definition. Other
methods such as [19, 42, 48] bypass the detection of sensitive
terms and inject additional keywords into the initial search query.
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It has been shown in [45] that this model is susceptible to de-
anonymisation attacks. On the other hand, techniques such as [5]
do not focus on (i), but source (ii) i.e., replacement entities from
related web documents while we use word embedding models for
this step.
Similarly, for plain text data, approaches such as [16, 17] address
(i) by using models to ‘recognize several classes of PII’ such as
names and credit cards, while [47] focuses on (ii) that is, sanitiz-
ing an entity c by removing all terms t that can identify c individ-
ually or in aggregate in a knowledge base K. Indeed, any privacy
preserving algorithm that places a priori classification on sensitive
data types assume boundaries on an attackers side knowledge and
a finite limit on potentially new classes of personal identifiers. Our
approach withdχ -privacy aims to do away with such assumptions
to provide tunable privacy guarantees.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a formal approach to carrying out
privacy preserving text perturbation using dχ -privacy. Our ap-
proach applied carefully calibrated noise to vector representations
of words in a high dimension space as defined by word embedding
models. We presented a theoretical privacy proof that satisfies dχ -
privacy where the parameter ε provides guarantees with respect to
a metric d(x, x ′) defined by the word embedding space. Our exper-
iments demonstrated that our approach provides tunable privacy
guarantees over 3 times greater than the baselines, while incurring
< 2% utility loss on training binary classifiers (among other task
types) for a range of ε values. By combining the results of our pri-
vacy and utility experiments, with our guidelines on selecting ε by
using worst-case guarantees from our plausible deniability statis-
tics, data holders can make a rational choice in applying our mech-
anism to attain a suitable privacy-utility tradeoff for their tasks.
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